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“CRIMINAL” INSANITY, DIAGNOSIS, AND 
PUBLIC MORALITY 
WILLIAM WALLER  
INTRODUCTION 
The insanity defense contains at its core an intractable tension between 
the insane as sick and the insane as criminally deviant. The very phrase 
―mentally-ill offender‖ ―epitomizes the social vectors of therapeutic 
concern for and punitive attack against those who deviate from our sexual 
habits, deprive us of our property, or threaten our physical well-being.‖1 
Sociopaths represent the apotheosis of this contradiction in that they suffer 
from a mental disease defined in terms of criminality. As such, these 
individuals have traditionally been treated differently from the insane and 
incompetent; they are denied the therapeutic approaches normally 
accorded to the mentally ill and routinely hammered with punishment 
within our criminal justice system.
2
  
This state of affairs provokes at least two worthy lines of inquiry: first, 
why the special treatment of sociopaths in the insanity defense and 
criminal law generally? And second, should it be otherwise? The answers 
to these questions, I will argue, move us far beyond the treatment of 
sociopaths to a general indictment of the social order and the criminal 
justice system that regulates it. In reality, sociopaths are a creation of 
psychiatric discourse, embraced by the criminal justice system for its 
convenience, and the contours of the insanity defense reflect this fact. 
While more critical considerations of moral responsibility might exculpate 
them, alongside numerous others, their persistence in the dominant 
ideology serves to conceal far more powerful—and hence far more 
threatening—sources of social harm.  
 
 
  Associate Notes Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D./M.S.W. 
candidate, Washington University School of Law & George Warren Brown School of Social Work 
2012.  
 1. Lawrence Zelic Freedman, Psychopathology and Social Offense, in BY REASON OF 
INSANITY: ESSAYS ON PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 101 (Lawrence Zelic Freedman ed., 1983). 
 2. Nancy Beran & Beverly Toomey, The Mentally Disordered Offender: A Historical 
Perspective, in MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5, 12 (Nancy Beran 
& Beverly Toomey eds., 1979). 
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I. SOCIOPATHY AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
A. The Nature of Sociopathy and the Criminal Law‟s Concern 
Neither ―sociopath‖ nor ―psychopath‖ is rigidly defined, though both 
appear frequently in the literature.
3
 To the extent the conditions are 
objectively meaningful, they can be found in the DSM-IV-TR
4
 under 
―antisocial personality disorder.‖5,6 Symptomatic behaviors are generally 
 
 
 3. SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL & ALEXANDER BROOKS, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 91 (2001). I will use ―sociopath‖ to refer first to a person diagnosable or diagnosed 
with antisocial personality disorder or the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(―DSM‖) predecessors, and second to the sort of pathological criminal that most concerns the justice 
system. Some of the psychiatric literature notes different connotations for sociopathy and psychopathy: 
for instance, sociopathy describes a behavioral disorder found in the DSM, whereas psychopathy 
―emphasizes personality traits, such as lack of empathy.‖ Maya Mei-Tal, The Criminal Responsibility 
of Psychopathic Offenders, 36 ISR. L. REV. 103, 105 (2002). The extent to which the concepts are 
exclusive is unclear, however, as antisocial personality disorder is loosely associated with the same 
personality traits as psychopathy. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WOLMAN, THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY 
(1987). Because the DSM‘s behavioral classification is most relevant with respect to the insanity 
defense, I will prefer use of the terms ―sociopath‖ and ―sociopathy.‖ It should be noted, however, that 
much of the literature conflates these terms or refers to ―psychopaths‖ in particular, and the concept of 
psychopathy becomes relevant, for instance, in the context of the death sentence.  
 4. The current iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the 
definitive catalogue of diagnostic criteria within the psychiatric profession, but also immensely 
influential in the general culture. 
 5. The behaviors constitutive of the disorder—with additional requirements based on age, life 
course, and the exclusion of certain Axis I disorders—are as follows: 
There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring 
since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following: (1) failure to conform to 
social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that 
are grounds for arrest; (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or 
conning others for personal profit or pleasure; (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead; (4) 
irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults; (5) 
reckless disregard for safety of self or others; (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by 
repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations; (7) lack of 
remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen 
from another. 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FROM DSM-IV-TR 291-2 (2000). 
 6. Prior to 1968, the American Psychiatric Association referred to individuals with a 
―psychopathic personality,‖ describing a person ―whose behavior is predominantly amoral or 
characterized by impulsive, irresponsible actions satisfying only immediate and narcissistic interests 
without concern for obvious and implicit social consequences accompanied by minimal outward 
evidence of anxiety or guilt.‖ Beran & Toomey, supra note 2, at 13 (footnote omitted) (quoting 
American Psychiatric Association) (noting that this older description is decidedly imprecise and 
vague). Then there was DSM-II, which reserved the category for ―individuals who are basically 
unsocialized and whose behavior patterns bring them repeatedly into conflict with society. They are 
incapable of significant loyalty to individuals, groups, or social values. They are grossly selfish, 
callous, irresponsible, impulsive, and unable to feel guilt or to learn from experience and punishment.‖ 
BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 91. ―Psychopathy‖ has been pathologized outside of antisocial 
personality disorder and the DSM, first by Harvey Cleckley, and more recently in R.D. Hare‘s 
Psychopathy Checklist, both of which mostly eschew specific behavioral symptoms in favor of more 
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construed as ―violat[ing] the rights of others,‖ and include specifically a 
―failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors,‖ 
―irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or 
assaults,‖ ―reckless disregard‖ for the safety of others, and ―lack of 
remorse‖ after hurting, mistreating, or stealing from others.7 In short, the 
disorder is constituted by behaviors proscribed by the criminal law and 
described in terms from its lexicon.
8
 
While antisocial personality disorder is in diagnostic terms entirely 
behavioral, there are other characteristics that have been built into the 
clinical picture over time. The most enduring of these, perhaps as a result 
of its disturbing implications, is the notion that the sociopath‘s criminal 
depravity lies buried beneath a dissimulating ―mask of sanity.‖9 Said mask 
serves to hide the fact that sociopaths ―appear to lack a conscience,‖10 
which presumably accounts for the ease of their criminality: sociopaths are 
expected to reoffend, and frequently.
11
  
Of further concern, the condition is only likely to be acknowledged 
through the meting out of criminal punishment. The conventional 
psychiatric wisdom is that ―[p]atients with antisocial personality disorder 
can fool even the most experienced clinician. In an interview, patients can 
appear composed and credible, but beneath the veneer . . . lurks tension, 
hostility, irritability, and rage.‖12 Stress interviews, in which patients are 
vigorously confronted with inconsistencies in their histories, may be 
 
 
general personality traits. See James R.P. Ogloff, Psychopathy/Antisocial Personality Disorder 
Conundrum, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCH. 519, 520–22 (2006) (listing characteristics of psychopathy as 
it is conceived by both Cleckley and Hare). 
 7. BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 92. 
 8. But see BENJAMIN & VIRGINIA SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 798 (10th ed. 2007) 
(―Although characterized by continual antisocial or criminal acts, the disorder is not synonymous with 
criminality . . . .‖). 
 9. SADOCK, supra note 8, at 798. See U.S. v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) (―There are 
grave disturbances in the patient‘s affective life as well as in foresight and the control and organization 
of behavior . . . Although the patient outwardly presents a ‗convincing mask of sanity‘ and a ‗mimicry 
of human life,‘ he has lost contact with the deeper emotional accompaniments of experience and with 
its purposiveness.‖) (quoting ROBERT WHITE, THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY 404 (1948)). But see 
BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 96 (―Cleckley‘s thesis was never mainstream psychiatry and 
moreover appears to be overread by Judge Biggs when he states that the psychopath is medically 
judged to be ‗very ill indeed‘ and ‗very distinguishable‘ from the mere criminal.‖); see generally 
HARVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO REINTERPRET THE SO-CALLED 
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY (1941) (advancing for the first time the notion of a ―mask of sanity‖). 
 10. SADOCK, supra note 8, at 798. 
 11. The DSM cautions that ―Only when antisocial personality traits are inflexible, maladaptive, 
and persistent . . . do they constitute Antisocial Personality Disorder.‖ BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 
3, at 92 (emphasis added).  
 12. SADOCK, supra note 8, at 798. 
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necessary to reveal the pathology, as may neurological examinations 
(whatever they may be looking for).
13
 
If this is the level of paranoia felt by clinicians, one can imagine much 
is warranted for officers of the court, unschooled in and unpracticed at 
clinical psychiatry. Barring a history of formal sanctions evincing the 
disorder, which the savvy sociopath is presumably well-equipped to 
evade,
14
 a person disposed to the antisocial behaviors condemned by the 
criminal law may well appear sympathetic and reasonable to juries, or to 
pose little future risk to judges deliberating sentencing.
15
  
Here then is the picture of the sociopath as conceived by the criminal 
law: an autonomous actor committing significantly more than his share of 
crimes, intelligent, manipulative, and lacking in remorse. Such persons 
appear conveniently to the public to be the raison d‘être of the criminal 
law, and consequently ought to feel its force most heavily.
16
 Or, to 
understate the case: ―considering the enormous destructive effect 
psychopaths may have on individuals and social relations, bringing them 
within the network of criminal liability is convenient in terms of the 
restraint of dangerous persons.‖17  
B. Forms of the Insanity Defense and Their Application to Sociopaths 
The ostensive purpose of the insanity defense is to exclude from 
criminal sanction those we adjudge to fall short of some threshold of 
personal or moral responsibility for the crime which they committed. The 
particular rationales for exculpation vary with the different jurisdictional 
tests. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American legal system has generally 
 
 
 13. Id.; Compare with the discussion of the diagnostic ―gold standard,‖ infra Part C. 
 14. ―[T]heir mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of 
irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress 
observers as having good verbal intelligence. [They] are highly representative of so-called con men. 
They are extremely manipulative . . . .‖ SADOCK, supra note 8, at 798. 
 15. A representative expression of what we might call ―sociopath panic‖ in the popular culture 
can be found in the 1996 Gregory Hoblit film Primal Fear. In the film, a sociopath (played by Edward 
Norton) manipulates his lawyer, a psychiatrist, and the judge into believing he is afflicted by 
dissociative identity disorder, and hence cannot be criminally responsible for the two brutal murders he 
committed. This film in particular illustrates our fear of the sociopath as a dissembling ―‗false 
negative‘—the individual predicted to be not dangerous who subsequently commits a violent act.‖ 
MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 176 (1994) (juxtaposing the public 
and systemic fascination with such cases with their empirical nonexistence).  
 16.  This seems to be the case. Sadock & Sadock note that ―in prison populations, the prevalence 
of antisocial personality disorder may be as high as 75 percent.‖ SADOCK, supra note 8, at 798; see 
also Ogloff, supra note 6, at 522 (―[R]esearch shows that the prevalence of Antisocial [personality 
disorder] ranges from 50% to 80% in prisons.‖) (footnote omitted).  
 17. Mei-Tal, supra note 3, at 107–08. 
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assumed sociopaths are responsible agents to whom the defense does not 
apply.
18
 Yet there is a prima facie case to be made that at least a portion of 
jurisdictions should allow the defense for individuals with antisocial 
personality disorder. 
The earliest and most prevalent American test for exculpatory insanity 
comes down the ages from the 1843 M‟Naghten case.19 For a successful 
defense, the test requires proof that 
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if 
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was 
wrong.
20
 
As noted, sociopaths generally have a strong sense of reality-testing and 
are generally rational; no delusion or defect of reason will excuse them 
under the M‟Naghten test. However, the strongest argument for applying 
this test to relieve sociopaths of criminal responsibility exists in those 
states where the word ―know‖ is read broadly to encompass ―affective‖ or 
―emotional‖ knowledge.21 The lack of such knowledge in the form of 
conscience or empathy is considered a primary characteristic of the 
sociopath. Furthermore, some jurisdictions have added an ―irresistible 
impulse‖ test, which allows the defense where a mental disease prevents 
the defendant from controlling his or her conduct.
22
 Insofar as a 
conscience or capacity for remorse can be construed to be prerequisites for 
morality-driven behavior,
23
 the irresistible impulse test may also apply to 
 
 
 18. Id. at 106; see also Heidi L. Maibom, The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath, 1 
NEUROETHICS 167, 167 (2008) (―Current US legal practice is to regard the psychiatric condition of 
psychopathy to be irrelevant to a defendant‘s legal responsibility. The insanity defense is generally not 
available to psychopaths.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 19. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 390 (5th ed. 2010). 
 20. M‘Naghten‘s Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). 
 21. RITA SIMON & DAVID AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT IN 
THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 14 (1988) (noting the construction but not making such an argument). 
 22. LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 390. 
 23. See Mei-Tal, supra note 3, at 106 ( ―[The psychopath] may be portrayed as an island unto 
himself, lacking the capacity to establish bonds that connect individuals to each other and which are 
essential for meaningful participation in human exchanges and compliance with social norms and 
law.‖) (footnotes omitted). Note that Mei-Tal disagrees that the insanity defense is conceptually 
applicable to sociopaths, focusing on their cognitive normalcy and the concern with cognition inherent 
to the defense: ―[B]ecause psychopaths have unimpaired cognitive faculties, they are presumed to be 
rational and therefore sane and are excluded from the system‘s established exemptions from criminal 
responsibility.‖ Id. at 107 (footnote omitted). But see Paul Litton, Responsibility Status of the 
Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 349 (2008) 
(arguing that incapacity to comprehend and act on moral reasons is a relevant cognitive deficit). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sociopaths—there is no cognitive mechanism inhibiting those antisocial 
desires that all of us, at one time or another, experience. 
In the years following M‟Naghten, a minority of jurisdictions adopted 
the Durham rule that: 
An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the 
product of mental disease or mental defect.  
 We use ―disease‖ in the sense of a condition which is considered 
capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use ―defect‖ in the 
sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either 
improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or 
the result of injury or the residual effect of a physical or mental 
disease.
24
 
It appears that by explicitly noting and describing both mental disease and 
defect, the court opened up a large expanse of territory in which a mentally 
ill defendant might ground the defense. In addition, the causal ambiguity 
embodied in the word ―product‖ would seem to allow for antisocial 
personality disorder—as much as any other clinically accepted disease or 
defect—to excuse the sociopath from criminal sanction. On balance, even 
if tentatively, the Durham test seems amenable to exculpating sociopaths.  
The clear case in which individuals with antisocial personality disorder 
are excluded from employing the insanity defense is under the Model 
Penal Code test.
25
 Under this test, a person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct ―if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.‖26 While only a minority of states use this 
approach,
27
 it is significant in this context because it specifically 
precludes—though not by name—an insanity defense undergirded by 
antisocial personality disorder: ―As used in this Article, the terms ‗mental 
disease or defect‘ do not include an abnormality manifested only by 
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.‖28 While presumably 
antisocial personality disorder may be related to a ―failure to apprehend 
the significance of [one‘s] actions in some deeper sense,‖ the authors of 
the Model Penal Code ―reject[] the position that, for purposes of 
 
 
 24. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001). 
 26. Id. (alteration in the original). 
 27. LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 390. 
 28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (see comments).  
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determining criminal responsibility, repeated wrongful conduct suffices in 
itself to establish mental disease or defect.‖29 It may be hard to disagree on 
first instinct—why would the criminal law excuse its most flagrant 
violators, those who pathologically defy its dictates?
30
  
Yet the Model Penal Code is just that—a scholarly model of 
reconstituted criminal law, employed only in a small minority of 
jurisdictions. It appears that in most jurisdictions sociopaths could be able 
to find a theoretical foothold, and yet they clearly are not doing so. One 
compelling response to this puzzle has been to deny that the defense is 
actually aimed at absolving certain persons of criminal responsibility on 
the basis of abnormal mental functioning. In this respect, there are two 
surprising aspects of the defense (one theoretical, and one with respect to 
how it is applied): in the first place, while exact numbers are difficult to 
determine, it is clear that the defense is raised in only a small percentage 
of criminal cases.
31
 No doubt this is due in large part to the prospect of 
indefinite civil commitment, which may seem harsh in comparison to a 
plea bargain or even a normal carceral sentence. Yet what is also 
surprising is that if mental illness actually nullifies criminal responsibility, 
it ought to do so in many cases by nullifying the requisite mens rea of 
most crimes.
32
 In other words, if we are serious about the mentally ill 
lacking responsibility for criminal conduct, we do not need an insanity 
defense—we can just start finding them not guilty.  
 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. The Supreme Court of California in People v. Fields gives a more detailed rationale for the 
explicit exclusion of sociopaths:  
[W]e foresee harmful legal and social consequences if an expert‘s diagnosis of mental illness 
and opinion of insanity could be based solely on recidivist behavior. If a pattern of antisocial 
behavior is sufficient basis for an insanity defense, then a substantial proportion of serious 
criminal offenders would be able to assert this defense . . . . But the assertion of the insanity 
defense by recidivists with no apparent sign of mental illness except their penchant for 
criminal behavior would burden the legal system, bring the insanity defense itself into 
disrepute, and imperil the ability of persons with definite mental illness to assert that defense.  
People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 371 (1984) (internal citations omitted). 
 31. See LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 424–25; see also ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 171–91 (1967).  
 32. Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the “Insanity Defense”—Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 
862–63 (1963). But see HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 137 (1972) 
(―[I]n fact the typical insanity-test phrases associated with absence of mens rea are all excessively 
vague or often inapplicable, [and] the usual criteria for absence of mens rea only infrequently obtain in 
the typical case where the insanity plea is used.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Goldstein and Katz argue, accordingly, that the real function of the 
defense:  
is to authorize the state to hold those ―who must be found not to 
possess the guilty mind mens rea,‖ even though the criminal law 
demands that no person be held criminally responsible if doubt is 
cast on any material element of the offense charged. . . . The 
insanity defense is not designed, as is the defense of self-defense, to 
define an exception to criminal liability, but rather to define for 
sanction [i.e. restraint] an exception from among those who would 
be free of liability.
33
 
We as a society show some level of resistance to making the seriously 
mentally ill feel the full force of the criminal sanction; nevertheless, 
socially undesirable conduct from ostensibly unaccountable actors is 
threatening and must be addressed.  
We can then see some ulterior reasons that sociopaths are not good 
candidates for the insanity defense, even if on the literal terms of a 
majority of permutations it ought to apply. Apart from self-selection, 
sociopaths can be handled routinely under the criminal law because their 
mental illness is, diagnostically speaking, behavioral. It need not, 
therefore, abrogate the requisite mens rea for more or less any offense. In 
addition, their essential dangerousness makes the criminal sanction 
eminently rational; there is little ambiguity about whether to take a 
punitive or therapeutic approach.
34
 Because the defense serves to control 
retribution, at least to some extent,
35
 society has enough reservation with 
applying the defense outside of situations where the accused possesses 
―certain overt, graphic, physiological characteristics.‖36 Faced with a 
 
 
 33. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 32, at 864–65 (footnotes omitted). 
 34. Id. at 868–69. Note, however, that when courts initially denied the insanity defense to 
sociopaths, many state legislatures responded by providing for their indefinite commitment 
(particularly in the case of ―sexual psychopaths‖) based on their ―exceptional dangerousness to 
society.‖ Beran & Toomey, supra note 2, at 13. This may be reconciled with the ostensibly huge 
number of sociopaths in normal jails and prisons in several ways: most states with such legislation 
apply it only or primarily to ―sexual psychopaths,‖ a population which deserves its own analysis; 
vague definitions of psychopathy found in such statutes allow the court to apply it only where the 
criminal offense is most serious or appalling (where execution is not contemplated or available, as 
indefinite commitment is arguably more punitive than a normal carceral sentence); and the courts 
desire to address perceived pathology more strenuously than normal criminality, and while defendants 
desire to avoid indefinite commitment to the extent possible. Additionally, not every court has held 
that sociopaths are ―sane‖ as a matter of law for purposes of the defense. Cf. U.S. v. Currens, 290 F.2d 
751 (3d Cir. 1961). 
 35. PERLIN, supra note 15, at 172. 
 36. Id. at 173. 
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disorder defined only in terms of a tendency toward antisocial behavior, 
however, and of which sufferers are sensationalized as evil, society will 
revert to its baseline of the criminal sanction: 
The insanity defense . . . is seen as ―cheating‖ this degradation [due 
to criminals] and as dissipating the opportunity for expressing 
hatred . . . by downplaying emotions of vengeance, it threatens 
social solidarity and raises ―the terrifying anxiety that the forces of 
good might not triumph against the forces of evil after all.‖ As a 
―moral judgment that mental illness is relevant to our determination 
of criminal culpability,‖ it is a judgment that society frequently 
wishes to decline making.
37
 
C. The Role of Psychiatry Within the Law and Vis-à-vis Sociopaths 
The controversy surrounding the insanity defense is premised on the 
distinction, commonly made in legal positivist thinking, between moral 
responsibility and legal responsibility.
38
 Moral responsibility boils down to 
whether one is a moral agent, and is therefore predicated on one 
possessing those cognitive capacities relevant to moral reasoning. Legal 
responsibility, on the other hand, is only actualized through the court‘s 
assignment of blame and concomitant punishment. In the context of the 
insanity defense, it is thought that moral responsibility prefigures legal 
responsibility; moral agents can be held accountable by the criminal law, 
while infants and lunatics are to be exculpated for otherwise criminal 
acts.
39
 Yet psychiatry—the ideological apparatus that gives us ―sociopath‖ 
 
 
 37. Id. at 172 (footnotes omitted). 
 38. For an extensive exploration of the distinction between the two types of responsibility see 
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2008). The distinction has also been 
described as between ―constative‖ and ―performative‖ responsibility or between ―basic‖ and 
―consequential‖ responsibility. See John Gardner, Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility, in THE 
LEGACY OF H.L.A. HART: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 129, 131 (Claire Grant et al. 
eds., 2008). 
 39. For instance: ―Punishment makes little sense unless those who are punished are indeed 
responsible for the wrongs that trigger a punitive response.‖ George P. Fletcher, Punishment and 
Responsibility, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW & LEGAL THEORY 514, 519 (Dennis 
Patterson ed., 1996). In tune with this sentiment, many scholars who argue against the criminal 
responsibility of sociopaths cite deficits in moral reasoning or other cognitive impairments relevant to 
moral agency as reasons for their position. See infra note 74. Those who truly disagree with this 
directionality of the relationship between the two types of responsibility are either realists who 
contend, like Goldstein and Katz, that other, ulterior legal motives determine (at least in the context of 
the insanity defense) legal responsibility; compatibilists who believe criminal responsibility is a 
function of social utility, like Daniel Dennett (see the discussion of his view infra note 78); or those 
like Joel Feinberg who see it as a matter of tautological ―competence.‖ Gardner, supra note 38, at 126–
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as a cognizable category—with its discourse of pathology, functions to 
collapse the distinction between these two types of responsibility. 
Explaining our society‘s treatment of sociopaths therefore requires 
grappling with the very nature of psychiatry, particularly as it interfaces 
with the criminal law. 
This collapsing phenomenon is important because, whether court-
ordered or requested by defense counsel, diagnostic conclusions play a 
critical role in the application of the insanity defense.
40
 As a DSM disorder 
diagnosis often functions as a threshold requirement for asserting the 
defense,
41
 the judgments of the psychiatrist concerning defendant 
pathology and mental state
42
 are the data considered in the application of 
the various insanity defense tests. In this respect, differential diagnosis is 
crucial: ―mental disease‖ is the only element of a defendant‘s mental state 
appearing in every insanity defense test in Anglo-American law.
43
 But the 
phenomenon is also important in light of the cultural influence that 
psychiatry and its practitioners wield. The way that mentally ill 
populations are categorized and described predisposes the way we tend to 
think about them. 
Interwoven with the criminal process are two distortional aspects of 
psychiatry that do much of the work of collapsing the distinction between 
moral and legal responsibility. First, the process of diagnosis itself serves 
to reify the raw material relevant to determinations of moral responsibility 
into cognizable, normatively charged categories. Second, the psychiatrist‘s 
role in conveying her impressions to the court exacerbates the diagnostic 
distortion by concealing both society‘s and her own normative 
presuppositions within an authoritative clinical picture. 
Diagnosis reifies into cognizable categories the various data of an 
individual‘s mental states and behavior. Broadly speaking, differential 
diagnosis is nosology without regard for etiology. Psychiatric pathologies 
 
 
27 (―[D]ogs, infants, and lunatics have the ability to kill, and perhaps to do so deliberately. They may, 
in other words, have the ability to act in ways that, if they were not dogs, infants, or lunatics, would 
qualify as murder. But they still lack the ability to murder, which is a normative ability.‖) (describing 
Feinberg‘s view). 
 40. LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 443 (―Upon completion of the examination, a report is prepared 
and copies are furnished to the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. The report is likely to have a 
very significant impact upon the outcome of the case.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 41. BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 61. 
 42. While a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder does not, strictly speaking, require an 
inquiry into mental states (as it is, clinically, a behavioral disorder), antisocial personality disorder is 
never presented per se as an exculpatory condition. Presumably, in the hypothetical case where the 
defense is applied to sociopaths, the diagnosis would be elaborated by impressions of mental states 
anyhow.  
 43. FINGARETTE, supra note 32, at 19. 
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are discerned almost exclusively by a clinician‘s judgment, whereas in 
physical medicine ―more objective investigatory procedures‖ are the 
norm.
44
 Psychiatric judgment apprehends clusters of symptoms resembling 
recognized disorders, and as such determines whether or not a particular 
symptom is present in the first place. While such symptoms are often 
broader than exhibited behaviors
45—encompassing, for instance, affect 
and perceptual states—they almost never countenance causation.46 To 
know an individual‘s diagnosis is to have no insight whatsoever into the 
phenomenological wellspring of his or her behavior,
47
 the grounds on 
which moral responsibility rests. 
Even if we were to accept the rosy view that ―a diagnostic system 
asserts that observable attributes are manifestations of unobserved 
categorical realities‖48—i.e., that there is a discrete pattern of causation, 
whether in terms of neurons or mental actions, underlying a given 
disorder—we would still face a persistent epistemic problem: 
If a diagnosis is to add information to the attributes themselves, that 
information must come from other research. The research must 
show that an underlying reality produces a characteristic profile of 
observable attributes, and that its presence or absence can be 
inferred from the profile with reasonable accuracy. This additional 
information, however, is largely unobtainable . . . .
49
 
Unfortunately, the epistemic problem is inherent to psychiatry. Iterations 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual are created and then refined on 
the basis of epidemiological observations concerning the aforementioned 
clusters of symptoms—there is no ―gold standard,‖ or mental thing itself, 
observed, noted, and then looked for in other patients.
50
 
 
 
 44. DAVID MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY: BEYOND MANAGED CARE 35 
(5th ed. 2008). 
 45. As noted previously, while antisocial personality disorder is defined solely in terms of 
exhibited behaviors, other traits are associated with the disorder in a sort of clinical folk wisdom. See 
supra part A. 
 46. Except, in some cases, to rule out symptoms caused by drug use or medical afflictions. 
 47. See, e.g., John Mirowsky & Catherine E. Ross, Psychiatric Diagnosis as Reified 
Measurement, 30 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 11, 19 (1989) (―Diagnosis ignores the structure of causal 
relationships among the variables on which it is based. It collapses causes, consequences, and spurious 
associations.‖). 
 48. Id. at 15. 
 49. Compare id. with Robert Kendell & Assen Jablensky, Distinguishing Between the Validity 
and Utility of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 8 (2003) (―[T]he crucial issue in 
determining validity is not understanding of etiology but rather the existence of clear boundaries or 
qualitative differences at the level of the defining characteristic.‖). 
 50. Kendell & Jablensky, supra note 49, at 8. This issue can also be expressed in terms of a 
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This is not to say that differential diagnosis is clinically useless. To the 
extent a clinician is not assigning a diagnosis on normative grounds, 
diagnosis serves a practical purpose for the patient:  
The terms are not designed to assist in the determination of whether 
or not a particular form of social control should be applied to a 
particular individual; they are designed merely to reduce the 
therapist‘s margin of error when he seeks to help the patient . . . . 
When they are not arguing with judges and lawyers, psychiatrists 
recognize full well that their terminology is no more than a method 
of classifying types of conduct and courses of therapy.
51
 
Yet with respect to personality disorders like antisocial personality 
disorder, it is unlikely that diagnosis can serve medical utility very well. 
Robert Weisberg conveys this sentiment by describing personality 
disorders as ―vexing,‖ in that 
[t]he things we call personality disorders are simultaneously 
unresolved in their causation and remarkably hard to cure. Thus, it 
is sometimes hard to see the medical utility of these disorder 
diagnoses—their value may lie more in cultural anthropology or 
sociology. When we look at the definitions of antisocial personality, 
as with other disorders, we often encounter a somewhat tautological 
sum of its symptoms. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The psychology of personality disorders does not inspire 
scientific confidence. Each personality disorder seems to blend 
genetic, neurobiological, and environmental causes.
52
 
 
 
signal-to-noise ratio. In psychiatric diagnosis, there is a tension between reliability (―the exactness of 
reproduction that can be achieved with a given measure‖) and certainty (how likely it is that the 
diagnosis is accurate). Mirowsky & Ross, supra note 47, at 18. Certainty that a diagnosis applies 
increases as we broaden diagnostic categories (with the broadest being a dichotomous yes or no). Yet 
broadening categories, while it increases certainty, causes the ratio of information-to-static to decline 
in the individual case. Id. at 18–19. Why is this a problem? For the insanity defense to operate within 
the boundaries desired by those fearful of exculpating too many criminal elements, it should at the 
very least be restrained by clinical judgments and diagnostic boundaries. However, fitting the situation 
of an individual into a diagnostic category must, barring perfect overlap, necessarily diminish the 
information (particularly causal) we have to work with about the individual‘s situation. And if our goal 
were to ascertain moral responsibility, this is precisely the opposite of the approach we ought to take. 
 51. Frank Cummings, Psychiatric Justice by Thomas Szasz, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 212, 217 (1966) 
(citing Bleuler, Research and Changes in Concepts in the Study of Schizophrenia, 1941–1950, 3 Bull. 
of the Isaac Ray Medical Library 1, 76 (1955)). 
 52. Robert Weisberg, The Values of Interdisciplinarity in Homicide Law Reform, 43 U. MICH. 
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Though the passage hints at the existence of a variegated etiology 
associated with personality disorders generally, it tentatively concludes 
that such disorders may be meaningful only in terms of ―cultural 
anthropology‖ or ―sociology‖—that is, in terms of the predominate social 
norms.
53
 
Thomas Szasz, psychiatry‘s most vehement iconoclast, is inclined to 
agree. He sees mental illnesses not as diseases that inhere in the 
individual, but as expressions of establishment norms with respect to ways 
of behaving.
54
 As opposed to physical diseases, where ―judgments about 
the mobility or immobility of a person‘s joint rest on a biological standard 
. . . judgments about the rationality or irrationality of a person‘s reasoning 
or thinking rest on a personal or societal standard.‖55 Similarly, Szasz 
posits that ―psychosis is [merely] behavior judged to be bad—injurious to 
the self or others.‖56 If these assertions hold true, then they clear up some 
of the perplexities surrounding the treatment of antisocial personality 
disorder under the law.
57
 Yet they also tell us that, with respect to mental 
 
 
J.L. REFORM 53, 68–69 (2009).  
 53. Apart from the reified category of antisocial personality disorder, there is a body of literature 
concerned with the connection between damage to the frontal lobe of the brain—that portion heavily 
associated with impulse control—and the onset of antisocial behavioral tendencies. See, e.g., Antonio 
R. Damasio, A Neural Basis for Sociopathy, 52 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 128, 128 (2000) (―Some 
prefrontal [cortex] sectors . . . seem to play an indispensible role in the achievement and maintenance 
of a normal social personality. Lesions that compromise these frontal sectors . . . impair the ability to 
make appropriate decisions in the personal and social realms.‖) (footnotes omitted); Mario F. Mendez, 
The Unique Predisposition to Criminal Violations in Frontotemporal Dementia, 38 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY LAW 318, 318 (2010) (―Epidemiological data and clinical information indicate a 
relationship between criminal behavior and brain disorders . . . . Acquired sociopathy, or antisocial 
acts with disturbances in the moral emotions linked to the interests or welfare of others, occurs in those 
with brain lesions affecting the inner or ventromedial prefrontal cortex.‖) (footnote omitted). We might 
conclude thereby that such behavior is neurobiologically rooted. However, this connection between 
somatic conditions and behavior does not represent the same thing as sociopathy/antisocial personality 
disorder as a mental illness, and therefore cannot explain its handling within the criminal justice 
system.  
 54. ―This, then, is why—absurdly—the subclass called mental illness actually comprises more 
members than does the class called disease, of which it is itself supposed to be a member. The 
category called mental illness includes everything from Alzheimer‘s disease and brain injury to racism 
and terrorism, whereas the category called disease includes only somatic pathology.‖ THOMAS SZASZ, 
INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 85 (1997). This is also why ―the mythology of mental 
illness and the rituals of psychiatry now make it virtually impossible for professional and layman alike 
to distinguish between phenomenon, label, and policy.‖ Id. at 169. For Szasz, the ―strategic‖ and 
―justificatory‖ nature of mental illness is a product of the programme of institutional psychiatry. We 
need not accept this second, more tendentious conclusion in order to embrace his argument that 
psychiatry is normatively loaded. It is difficult to argue, for instance, that the inclusion and subsequent 
exclusion of homosexuality from the DSM was the product of anything other than a normative dispute. 
 55. Id. at 252. 
 56. Id. at 253.  
 57. As antisocial personality disorder consists in a list of behaviors that are apparently the 
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illness, the law is not determining moral responsibility. Moral 
responsibility is already built into the various modalities of criminal 
punishment applied to mental illness.
58
 
Part and parcel of this normative function for psychiatry within the law 
is the role of psychiatric testimony. Psychiatrists deal with the 
phenomenological concepts related to determining moral responsibility 
from their own normatively charged perspective.
59
 Both teleological 
judgments (e.g., the defendant committed murder because he is a 
psychopath) and epistemic judgments (e.g., the defendant knew that what 
he did was wrong) are smuggled into ostensibly scientific determinations 
about the defendant‘s clinical status.60 In this way, the psychiatrist 
becomes a normative authority before the law: 
[O]nce the idea arises that a person must be ―blameworthy‖ before 
being punished, we are forced into the position of having to 
determine when and in what measure ―blame‖ can be assigned to 
anyone who has violated our criminal laws. It is this social and 
 
 
product of voluntary and knowledgeable actions, sociopaths are merely a specific class of super-
criminals who can be expected to take those actions. Likewise, it elaborates the refusal of the insanity 
defense to include sociopaths, since to be exculpated, one must be a certain sort of mentally ill, the sort 
harmless or pitiful enough to be excluded from criminal punishment. 
 58. That is to say, in the case of sociopaths, these consummate criminals are first legally 
responsible—in that the law determines what the lawbreaking constitutive of their disorder is—and 
only by extension morally responsible. 
 59. FINGARETTE, supra note 32, at 85. Fingarette offers a variety of respects in which this is the 
case, but his main point seems to be that the psychiatrist acts much like a second judge—rather than 
providing the data relevant to responsibility simpliciter, she has already assigned moral responsibility 
in a way that surely influences the judge‘s subsequent determination: 
 To sum up, then, the psychiatrist is constantly and subtly making complex 
discriminations of various sorts concerning the moral concerns of the patient and the patient‘s 
perceptions of the most obvious sorts of communal attitudes and laws. The psychiatrist also 
tacitly makes certain essentially noncontroversial moral judgments. How, then, can the 
psychiatrist rise in righteous objection to the request by the courts that he testify concerning 
the moral perceptions and attitudes of a person and the ability of that person to integrate these 
perceptions and attitudes into his total conduct? 
Id. at 117 (footnote omitted). 
 60. This is a predictable aspect of the vagueness inherent in diagnosis. Before evaluating to what 
extent behavioral symptoms line up with those specified in the disorder, the behavior of the 
patient/defendant must be operationalized. With respect to antisocial personality disorder, this may be 
easy enough where there is a past history of formal sanctions for criminal behavior—in which case the 
diagnosis is purely tautological—but significantly more elusive where ―violating the rights of others‖ 
is the factor to be instantiated. Either way, it evinces the criminalizing, normative function of 
psychiatry. Alternatively, the psychiatrist is liable to simply come out and say what she believes is 
going on in the sociopathic defendant‘s head.  
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scientific gap into which the contemporary psychiatrist has 
projected himself.
61
 
As the psychiatrist is influential or even determinative in the process of 
assigning blame, how this is done must itself be influenced to an 
appreciable extent by the psychiatrist‘s own moral judgments, which 
include judgments about when to assign moral responsibility.
62
 To the 
extent that this is true, the objective data relevant to determining moral 
responsibility are bypassed in favor of an arbitrary normative judgment.
63
 
Those values employed are implicit and unreflective, which serves to 
obscure their actual source when proffered to the court.  
A prime example of the psychiatrist‘s role in making such normative 
assignments can be found in the context of sentencing in capital cases. In 
such cases, use of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist—Revised drastically 
increases the likelihood that juries will sentence a defendant to death.
64
 In 
reality, the instrument is a glaring invitation for a clinician to invoke her 
own—and society‘s—moral judgment. Transgressions of bourgeois 
morality like ―promiscuous sexual behavior,‖ ―many short-term marital 
relationships,‖ ―need for stimulation/proneness to boredom,‖ and ―lack of 
realistic, long-term goals‖ all become indicators of psychopathy.65 The 
instrument also indulges in some politically charged (and racialized) 
tropes common in conservative discourse: ―failure to accept responsibility 
for actions‖ and a ―parasitic lifestyle‖66 are character flaws attributed here 
 
 
 61. Thomas Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 183, 189 
(1958). Szasz, as discussed, argues that diagnosis is ―acting simply in the role of one of society‘s 
blame-assigning agencies.‖ Id. This is Fingarette‘s logic taken to the extreme: not only are data 
pertinent to moral responsibility colored by the psychiatrist‘s own moral judgment; the two are 
actually indistinguishable.  
 62. SZASZ, supra note 54, at 253 (―How, then, do psychiatrists ascertain whether a particular 
person who has committed a violent act was or was not psychotic? The answer is: They don‘t. That is 
the wrong question to ask. The right question is: Under what circumstances do psychiatrists (and 
others) ascribe psychosis to the perpetrator of a certain act?‖). 
 63. In the sense that it is the product of the psychiatrist‘s personal judgment synthesized with 
those preferences of society and the law that the psychiatrist has internalized. 
 64. John F. Edens et al., The Impact of Mental Health Evidence on Support for Capital 
Punishment: Are Defendants Labeled Psychopathic Considered More Deserving of Death?, 23(5) 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 603, 618 (2005); but see generally Jennifer Cox et al., The Effect of the Psychopathy 
Checklist—Revised in Capital Cases: Mock Jurors‘ Responses to the Label of Psychopathy, 28(6) 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 878 (2010) (suggesting an absence of juror bias with respect to defendants labeled 
―psychopath‖ when sentencing in a capital murder case). 
 65. See Ogloff, supra note 6, at 522 (listing relevant factors).  
 66. Id. As one might expect, several of the instrument creator‘s publications display a moralizing 
and scaremongering orientation toward what he terms ―intraspecies predators‖—in other words, 
sociopath panic in its most hysterical clinical dimension. See, e.g., R.D. Hare et al., Lethal Predators: 
Psychopathic, Sadistic, and Sane, 5(3) INT‘L J. EMERGENCY MENTAL HEALTH 121 (2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
198 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:183 
 
 
 
 
to psychopaths; outside this context, these would be charges leveled at 
welfare recipients or the urban poor. 
Given the criminal behavioral construct through which sociopathy is 
conceptualized, we can conclude in light of these distortional functions of 
psychiatry that the psychiatrist is merely affirming an individual‘s fitness 
for criminal punishment in the process of diagnosing it.
67
 On this point a 
historicizing perspective is revealing: 
The labels keep changing, along with changing times. . . . We began 
with ―possessed‖ youths in the seventeenth century, moved to the 
―rabble‖ or ―dangerous classes‖ in the eighteenth and late 
nineteenth centuries, the ―moral imbeciles‖ and the ―constitutional 
psychopathic inferiors‖ of the early twentieth century. We 
continued in the twentieth century with the ―psychopath‖ of the 
1940s to the ―sociopath‖ of the 1950s, and finally to more recent 
labels like ―compulsive delinquent,‖ the ―learning disabled,‖ the 
―unsocialized aggressive,‖ even the ―socialized aggressive,‖ and 
finally the ―bored‖ delinquent.‖ ―With the growth of 
professionalism, the number of labels has multiplied 
exponentially.‖68 
The purported objectivity of clinical discourse is belied by the historical 
fluidity with which clinical labels are applied to mark certain segments of 
the population as essentially criminal.
69
  
In summary, while the insanity defense ostensibly serves to exculpate 
those mentally ill persons unworthy of criminal punishment, sociopaths 
nevertheless consistently receive such punishment. This is precisely what 
we would expect given the contours of antisocial personality disorder and 
sociopathy as it is commonly regarded. However, the situation also helps 
to illustrate the normative undercurrent in psychiatry, both conceptually 
and in the practice of psychiatrists with respect to the criminal justice 
 
 
 67. This is, of course, a generalization. While I share Szasz‘s view that the underpinnings of 
psychiatry and psychiatric practice are normative, I do not wish to imply that I share his view of its 
uniformity of institutional purpose: ―Even within psychiatry there is widespread disagreement as to 
whether psychopathy is a form of mental illness, a form of evil or a form of fiction.‖ BRAKEL & 
BROOKS, supra note 3, at 91 (citing SEYMOUR HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 
99 (1967). 
 68. RANDALL SHELDEN, CONTROLLING THE DANGEROUS CLASSES 289 (2001) (quoting from 
Jerome Miller, Search and Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System (1996)). 
 69. Foreshadowing the conclusion of this work, Miller explains that these labels are a means 
―‗whereby we bolster the maintenance of the existing order against threats that might arise from its 
own internal contradictions;‘‖ the existing order reassures us ―that the fault lies in the warped offender 
and takes everyone else off the hook.‖ Id. 
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system. Correspondingly, we understand now that sociopaths are assigned 
blame through the discourse of pathology because to be a sociopath just is 
to be someone deemed essentially blameworthy. We should hardly expect 
the insanity defense to run counter to this fact.  
II. SHOULD SOCIOPATHS BE HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE? 
Now that we have some sense as to why the criminal justice system 
treats sociopaths the way it does, it raises the questions whether this state 
of affairs is right or desirable. Having already raised the distinction 
between moral and legal responsibility in order to show the manner in 
which psychiatry mistreats it, we might now take up our analytical 
retractor and attempt to separate them out. Two implicit frameworks 
dominate the approaches by which moral responsibility is assigned in 
relation to mental illness: libertarianism and compatibilism. We will begin 
by examining how sociopaths fare under both. As it turns out, the results 
are far from uniform. Criminal punishment, however, requires a sturdier 
foundation. I wish to argue that a Marxist framework, though it leads to 
some radical conclusions about the way sociopaths (and other criminal 
elements) ought to be handled, is the only approach capable of 
satisfactorily resolving the contradictions at the heart of the insanity 
defense. 
A. Libertarian Responsibility as a Matter of Will and Intentionality 
In many ways the colloquial approach, a libertarian account of freedom 
generally seeks to establish moral responsibility as a function of the 
individual actor‘s powers or capacities. Within this framework, perhaps 
the most vigorous formulation of criminal responsibility vis-à-vis moral 
responsibility can be found in Hegel‘s Philosophy of Right:  
Punishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of his own will. 
The violation of right has been proclaimed by the criminal as his 
own right. His crime is the negation of right. Punishment is the 
negation of this negation, and consequently an affirmation of right, 
solicited and forced upon the criminal by himself.
70
 
 
 
 70. Karl Marx, Capital Punishment, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 17, 1853, available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/02/18.htm (quoting HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
(1820)). 
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According to Hegel in this passage, the necessity of punishment—legal 
responsibility—inheres in the criminal‘s freely willed act—his moral 
responsibility—as its dialectical counterpart. Other libertarian views are 
less dialectical, but nonetheless retain this basic form. 
Later accounts as to what constitutes moral responsibility often 
emphasize the intentionality of the action or the agent‘s capacity for 
choosing the right action, independently of the action‘s social utility.71 
Unsurprisingly, then, many libertarians view sociopaths to be morally, and 
therefore legally, responsible creatures.
72
 Sociopaths have enough 
cognitive capacity to perceive that certain behaviors are regarded as wrong 
by society and as such carry certain consequences, even if they cannot 
affectively appreciate that wrongness for themselves. Or, more simply, 
they intend to perpetrate acts that are malum in se and to excuse them 
would be ―tantamount to excusing someone for committing a crime 
because they are bad.‖73 
Other scholars of this persuasion disagree, for various reasons, that 
sociopaths necessarily possess the relevant intentionality or capacities 
required for moral and criminal responsibility.
74
 Some of these hold to a 
sort of continuum view, where ―the degree to which individuals have the 
neurological capacity to conform their conduct consistent with shared 
cooperative norms, ‗lies on a continuum‘ shaped by ‗early social, 
 
 
 71. For a representative of the former view, see SZASZ, supra note 54, at 222 (―As philosophers 
have always emphasized, what distinguishes us as human beings from other living things is that we 
act. The idea of the person as moral agent thus presupposes and includes the idea of intentionality.‖); 
for a representative of the latter view, see Gardner, supra note 38, at 130 (discussing Hart‘s account of 
basic responsibility in relation to the law). 
 72. See, e.g., Maibom, supra note 18, at 167 (―In short, [psychopaths] do not appear to be either 
cognitively or volitionally impaired in a way relevant to criminal responsibility.‖); Michael Corrado, 
What Purposes Does the Insanity Defense Serve, and Are Those Purposes Commensurate with Current 
Scientific Knowledge Regarding Insanity?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 481, 508 (2009); Mei-Tal, supra 
note 3, at 107 (―[B]ecause psychopaths have unimpaired cognitive faculties, they are presumed to be 
rational and therefore sane and are excluded from the system‘s established exemptions from criminal 
responsibility.‖) (articulating the criminal law establishment‘s view) (footnote omitted).  
 73. Maibom, supra note 18, at 167; see also Corrado, supra note 72, at 508 (―The very sentiment 
that the insanity test should not capture the psychopath argues in favor of a volitional approach.‖) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 74. See, e.g., Mei-Tal, supra note 3 (arguing psychopaths ought to be absolved of responsibility 
on the basis of their inability to employ moral reasoning); Litton, supra note 23 (arguing that 
psychopaths suffer from a cognitive deficit absolving them of responsibility); Stephen J. Morse, 
Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 1 NEUROETHICS 205 (2008) (arguing that psychopaths lack 
the capacity for moral rationality, and thus are not responsible for malum in se crimes); cf. Walter 
Glannon, Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath, 1 NEUROETHICS 158 (2008) (arguing that a 
psychopath‘s cognitive and affective impairment mitigates, but does not eliminate, responsibility for 
criminal conduct). 
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biological, and genetic mechanisms.‘‖75 With respect to these scholars, for 
whom there is no discrete volitional mechanism with which to signify 
moral responsibility, the question of sociopathic responsibility may 
become ineffably complex—and therefore indeterminate. 
B. The Compatibilist Calculus for Determining Moral Responsibility 
In contrast, the compatibilist view of human action and moral 
responsibility might be summarized as follows: ―While human choices are 
caused—and so are determined—free choice is not precluded. Even if 
caused, choice can be rational and noncoerced, and that is all that matters 
for responsibility.‖76 In one sense, the acknowledgement that causal 
determinism underlies all human action is a mighty leveler. The actions of 
the criminally insane and the upstanding citizen are equal with respect to 
responsibility in that both originate causally ―outside‖ of the individual.77 
Having a particular assemblage of characteristics that coalesce into 
sociopathic behavior is as much a matter of chance as being born into 
wealth.  
The implications of such leveling are troublesome. Our first inclination 
may be to question how anyone can be morally responsible, and hence 
held to be legally responsible. As the Marquis de Sade put it:  
What would become of your laws, your morality, your religion, 
your gallows, your Paradise, your Gods, your Hell, if it were shown 
that such and such fluids, such fibres, or a certain acridity in the 
blood, or in the animal spirits, alone suffice to make a man the 
object of your punishments or your rewards?
78
  
Taking this sentiment to its logical conclusion, our notions of differential 
punishment can be no more than intersubjective fictions, which realization 
ought to lead us to ―level down‖ responsibility for all. 
 
 
 75. Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in the Age of “Mind-Reading,” 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1191, 1208 n.71 (2009) (quoting Adrian Raine, Psychopathy, Violence and Brain Imaging, in 
VIOLENCE & PSYCHOPATHY 35, 50–51 (Adrian Raine & Jose Sanmartin eds., 2001)). Note that the 
continuum view departs at least in part from the reified diagnostic category of antisocial personality 
disorder criticized throughout this piece. 
 76. Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 724 (1992). 
 77. For the diametric view that free will requires causality originating within the agent—so-
called ―agent-causation‖—see generally RODERICK CHISHOLM, PERSON AND OBJECT: A 
METAPHYSICAL STUDY (1976). 
 78. J.J.C. Smart, Free Will, Praise and Blame, in FREE WILL 58, 59 (Gary Watson ed., 2d ed. 
2003) (quoting NIGEL BALCHIN, THE ANATOMY OF VILLAINY 174 (2000)). 
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Most scholars would agree this move goes too far. Instead of 
completely leveling all attributions of responsibility, we might prefer to 
―draw[] and defend[] a line between exculpating pathology . . . and 
varieties of falling-short that still leave agents genuinely culpable.‖79 This 
is in a sense easily done: since everyone is, metaphysically speaking, as 
responsible or non-responsible as everyone else, the line can be drawn 
arbitrarily. To avoid this arbitrariness, most compatibilists would insist we 
do (or ought to) draw the line in accordance with social utility: ―whatever 
responsibility is, considered as a metaphysical state, unless we can tie it to 
some recognizable social desideratum, it will have no rational claim on 
our esteem.‖80  
On this sort of social utility compatibilist view, the ―mentally 
incompetent and insane‖ can be seen as paradigmatic cases of exculpatory 
pathology.
81
 We excuse them from (criminal) liability because 
they manifestly do not meet the minimal conditions for 
deterrability, and the attempt to educate them, to bring them up to 
the knowledge and comprehension threshold, would be fruitless—or 
at least too costly. To punish them as if they were responsible 
citizens would be to undermine the very institution of punishment 
(which depends on its credibility) by undermining its rationale.
82
 
Now, one could question the position that deterrability and social 
legitimacy are the grounds of drawing the line in this way, but the broader 
point that we might do so as a matter of social utility would remain.  
This sort of compatibilist analysis of the sociopath‘s responsibility 
could lead to the following conclusion: we ought to insulate society from 
its dangerous elements, but to the extent those elements are understood to 
be lacking in the capacity for moral action we will generally treat them 
well in doing so.
83
 Or, given the presumed ability of sociopaths to 
cognitively grasp the social consequences of their actions, this framework 
might lead to harsh punishment of those with antisocial personality 
disorder as a means to deter them (and other criminal elements).
84
 Either 
 
 
 79. DANIEL DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 157 
(1984). In fact, Dennett implicitly assumes the validity of the insanity defense, which he gives as an 
example of demarcating ―exculpatory pathology.‖ For him, there is no jurisprudential quandary, since 
its contours should be determined by a mundane calculation of the social utility involved. 
 80. Id. at 163. 
 81. Id. at 161. 
 82. Id. 
 83. I.e., they are to be institutionalized rather than imprisoned. See, e.g., Mei-Tal, supra note 3, at 
121. 
 84. In order to deter both sociopaths and those who would use having the disorder as a calculated 
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way, for the compatibilist, the determinative inquiry will uncover what our 
goals are as a society and which approach to this especially criminal 
population will best serve those goals. Of course, this presumes that ―our‖ 
goals as a society be mutual, or at least reconcilable, and herein lies the 
crux of compatibilist disagreement with respect to sociopaths. 
C. Who is Right? And a Third Way 
Our examination has so far been confined to the realm of mental 
illness, but these rationales for assigning moral responsibility apply much 
more broadly than that. Cognizant of this fact, the National Commission 
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws noted that ―the insanity defense 
discriminates against persons who commit crimes because of influences on 
their personalities other than mental disease or defect.‖85 The Commission 
goes on to quote Professor Norval Morris: 
It too often is overlooked that one group‘s exculpation from 
criminal responsibility confirms the inculpation of other groups. 
Why not permit the defense of dwelling in a Negro ghetto? Such a 
defense would not be morally indefensible. Adverse social and 
subcultural background is statistically more criminogenic than is 
psychosis; like insanity, it also severely circumscribes the freedom 
of choice which a non-deterministic criminal law (all present 
criminal law systems) attributes to accused persons. True, a defense 
of social adversity would politically be intolerable; but that does not 
vitiate the analogy for my purposes. You argue that insanity 
destroys, undermines, diminishes man‘s capacity to reject what is 
wrong and to adhere to what is right. So does the ghetto—more so. 
But surely, you reply, I would not have us punish the sick. Indeed I 
would, if you insist on punishing the grossly deprived. To the extent 
that criminal sanctions serve punitive purposes, I fail to see the 
difference between these two defenses. To the extent that they serve 
 
 
excuse (something like, ―your honor, the fact that I am guilty of these crimes indicates I am too sick to 
be held responsible for my actions‖). See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the Integrationist 
Test as a Replacement for the Special Defense of Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 523, 536–37 (2009) 
(―[P]sychopaths still perceive reality accurately and understand that we do not want them to commit 
criminal offenses. If they nonetheless commit crime, the pragmatic retributivist should have no 
problem finding psychopaths blameworthy, and from a general deterrence perspective the last thing we 
should want to do is tell these offenders that they will be excused rather than punished for their 
harmful behavior.‖).  
 85. 1 Working Papers § 503, 251 (Nat‘l Comm‘n on Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws, 1970). 
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rehabilitative, treatment, and curative purposes I fail to see the need 
for the difference.
86
 
While Professor Morris frames his point in the context of ―non-
deterministic criminal law,‖ we see here a conditional assent to the 
compatibilist framework for purposes of ―leveling down‖ assigned 
responsibility, so that the ―grossly deprived‖ might hypothetically receive 
the same treatment as the criminally insane. 
At least two replies can be offered to Professor Morris, both of which 
bear on the question of sociopathic responsibility. The first is to deny that 
the defense, as it exists, must necessarily ―inculpate as it exculpates,‖ at 
least for the populations he considers relevant. We can briefly examine 
this possibility by way of the peculiar ―black rage‖ defense, an exculpatory 
approach to a population that is often regarded in ways analogous to the 
sociopath. Second, one might take his position to its suggested logical 
conclusion, as Karl Marx did, and abrogate criminal responsibility for a 
much larger class of humanity than previously thought justifiable. Given 
the way in which sociopaths epitomize the normative concern of the 
criminal law as interpreted through the lens of psychiatry, this radical 
maneuver covers them as well as (or better than) any other criminal 
element. 
1. Exculpatory Black Rage 
Like sociopaths, Black men have been a persistent focus of the criminal 
law, and the disproportionate recipients of its harshest punishments.
87
 It 
may come as a surprise, then, that the insanity defense has been in rare 
instances successfully applied to this population. The ―black rage‖ defense 
in question was the result of the strategic use of the insanity defense by 
progressive criminal defense lawyers in the early 1970s to ―explain a black 
defendant‘s criminal behavior in terms of the oppressive reality of a black 
person‘s life in the United States.‖88 The insanity defense can be thus 
deployed by ―characterizing the defendant‘s anger as a ‗transient 
situational disturbance,‘ a psychiatrically recognized ‗mental disease‘ 
 
 
 86. Working Papers, supra note 85, at 251 (quoting Norval Morris, Psychiatry in the Legal 
Process: “A Knife that Cuts Both Ways,‖ 41 S. CAL. REV. 514, 520 (1968)).  
 87. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that Black criminality is largely a function of racialized 
criminalization—the War on Drugs in particular—but also indicating ways in which criminalization 
leads to criminogenic conditions for this marginalized segment of American society).  
 88. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and 
the Practice of Law, 11 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 403 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
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which means that the defendant temporarily cracked under pressure.‖89 In 
a fitting inversion of the criminalizing discourse of pathology, the use of 
the defense in this manner exculpates by ―present[ing] sociopolitical 
reality to the jury under the legal rubric of evidence relevant to temporary 
insanity.‖90 This sort of insanity defense does not require psychiatric 
expert witness testimony to be successful; instead, lay witnesses testify to 
the daily microaggressions suffered by the marginalized defendant.
91
 
Unusually humanizing for defenses in this legal category, the defendant 
testifies ―in an attempt to give the jury some insight into the social 
pressures which drove him to a criminal act.‖92 It has promisingly not been 
confined solely to the racial dimension of socioeconomic inequality—it 
has also been successfully applied, for instance, to the perpetually 
incarcerated.
93
 
The use of the defense in this context is instructive in a number of 
ways. First, it links a non-diagnostic population of special concern to the 
criminal law to its psychiatric brethren (as does Professor Morris), and in 
so doing helps to lay bare the normative judgments concealed by the 
psychiatric discourse of pathology—as well as the emancipatory potential 
of that discourse when turned on its head.
94
 Second, by invoking the 
criminogenic tendencies of socioeconomic and racial inequality as an 
exculpatory factor, it rises to Professor Morris‘s challenge. Yet this radical 
repurposing draws some obvious criticisms. For one thing, it loses the 
allegedly clear line of demarcation thought to be provided by diagnosis. 
And, more seriously, it is thought to foster public disrespect for the law 
because its logic dictates that ―[e]veryone is a victim and no one is 
responsible.‖95  
 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. Thus eliminating the criminalizing normative effects of psychiatric testimony in favor of 
an exculpatory layperson perspective. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 404. Generally, this sort of defense has been subsumed under the heading of ―welfare 
criminology,‖ which, in addition to ―black rage,‖ also includes such criminogenic maladies as ―urban 
psychosis‖ and ―urban survival syndrome.‖ BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 160. 
 94. As might be expected, conservative reactions to the more recent case of Colin Ferguson 
disagreed with the emancipatory potential of the defense. See, e.g., Clarence Page, Black Rage: A 
Defense For The Times, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 29, 1994, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-
05-29/news/9405290179_1_whites-poll-results-william-kunstler; Nicolaus Mills, The Shame Of „Black 
Rage‟ Defense, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 6, 1994, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-06-06/ 
news/9406060097_1_kunstler-and-kuby-william-kunstler-colin-ferguson. 
 95. BRAKEL & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 160.  
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To the first criticism, it might be replied that diagnosis demarcates 
clearly only because it is arbitrary.
96
 This observation permits us to bring 
into the official discourse the large-scale and longitudinal nature of the 
connection between social environment and criminogenic tendencies, 
which connection is so all-encompassing that it obviates the need for 
demarcation.
97
 To this end, acceptance of the Black rage defense is merely 
a discursive stepping stone. Incidentally, this move also meets the second 
objection: where crime is the predictable product of a certain social order, 
unopposed and even vindicated by a reactive legal regime, why should we 
continue to regard that legal regime to be worthy of respect?  
2. Exculpation on a Mass Scale 
To be intellectually satisfying, the move from an insanity defense to a 
much broader ―criminogenicity‖ defense requires a radical logic, one that 
can address itself to the traditional libertarian and compatibilist approaches 
to moral responsibility. Such a logic has already been articulated by Karl 
Marx. Marx found Hegel‘s aforementioned formula for punishment to be 
―specious‖: ―instead of looking upon the criminal as the mere object, the 
slave of justice, [Hegel] elevates him to the position of a free and self-
determined being.‖98 Hegel is superimposing the illusion of libertarian 
freedom, and the sort of moral responsibility it demands, upon a socially 
deterministic situation. He continues: 
Looking, however, more closely into the matter, we discover that 
German idealism here, as in most other instances, has but given a 
transcendental sanction to the rules of existing society. Is it not a 
delusion to substitute for the individual with his real motives, with 
multifarious social circumstances pressing upon him, the abstraction 
of ―free-will‖—one among the many qualities of man for man 
himself! This theory, considering punishment as the result of the 
criminal‘s own will, is only a metaphysical expression for the old 
―jus talionis‖ eye against eye, tooth against tooth, blood against 
blood. Plainly speaking, and dispensing with all paraphrases, 
punishment is nothing but a means of society to defend itself against 
 
 
 96. And, in the case of antisocial personality disorder, it merely reflects the attribution of 
criminality to a particular population. 
 97. Id. (―[W]here is the stopping point once we decide to admit socio-economic and cultural facts 
in the trial phase?‖). 
 98. Marx, supra note 70. 
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the infraction of its vital conditions, whatever may be their 
character.
99
  
In other words, punishment, like the criminal, is the product of social 
conditions and the necessities those conditions generate—for instance, the 
criminogenic oppression uncovered in the use of the ―black rage‖ defense. 
It is decidedly not the product of a transcendental sense of justice as 
applied to an a priori moral responsibility. Talking of free actions or 
intentionality, as Hegel and other libertarians do, serves only to maintain 
the ideological assumption that justice is being done through the criminal 
law, so that those crime-producing social conditions might remain free 
from interrogation.
100
  
In another sense, the examination of responsibility as intentionality is 
simply running into the law of large numbers. Regardless of whether the 
notion that criminals are free actors making bad choices reflects reality, we 
cannot escape the fact that those with certain origin stories, reflected in 
certain characters or personalities, are committing their disproportionate 
share of crimes in consistent and predictable proportions.
101
 In response to 
our purported obliviousness regarding this fact, Marx quotes the 
criminologist Adolphe Quételet: 
There is a budget which we pay with frightful regularity—it is that 
of prisons, dungeons and scaffolds. . . . We might even predict how 
many individuals will stain their hands with the blood of their 
fellow men, how many will be forgers, how many will deal in 
poison, pretty nearly the same way as we may foretell the annual 
births and deaths.
102
 
If the criminal law were dealing justly with free actors in a causal vacuum, 
we would expect to see a wildly fluctuating criminal landscape, not crime 
for which a budget can be produced. What it must confront, then, are the 
predictability and the unfairness of a criminal order predicated almost 
 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Marx‘s position stands most starkly at odds with the libertarian framework, but is also at 
issue with combatibilism as I have portrayed it. Proffering social utility as an explanation for the 
criminal law regime, as the compatibilists do, conflates the particular interests concealed within the 
dominant ideology with social utility as the broad, utilitarian project the phrase suggests. Marx also 
leaves us to answer the question: in whose interest is it to preserve the current criminogenic social 
order? 
 101. Marx himself notes the striking regularity of proportions within crime statistics over time. 
Yet this is convincing for conceptual reasons as well: the predictability of criminogenic factors is, after 
all, a prerequisite for the continued existence of criminology in the academy. 
 102. Marx, supra note 70. 
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entirely on a social one. There is a bright side to this realization, however: 
criminality, thought to be difficult to reach due to the perceived 
intermediary of a free and unpredictable actor (or conversely an 
incorrigible pathology), can be accessed instead through alteration of the 
actor‘s social conditions. We have the capacity as a society to prevent 
crime on the front end, rather than retroactively indulging in punishment 
by way of the legal regime.
103
 Furthermore, with this approach we no 
longer have need of an insanity defense: its selective exculpatory function, 
which initially seemed so problematic, is rendered unnecessary. 
D. Dealing with Sociopathy 
Where do sociopaths fit within this newly expanded framework? In the 
first instance we know that sociopaths, like the marginalized and 
disenfranchised, are predictably criminal elements. We have reason to 
believe that psychiatry conspires with the criminal law to make them so, 
by creating and reaffirming their essential criminality through the 
discourse of pathology. Yet in reality, most of those sociopaths caught up 
in the criminal justice system—and there appears to be enormous overlap 
between the two groups, diagnosable sociopaths and inmates
104—must be 
those who, whether on account of their race, class, or other form of 
marginalization, belong to an especially criminogenic (or especially 
criminalized) population. The American carceral state is the largest in the 
world, and it beggars belief to suggest that this is on account of our 
uniquely robust sociopath demographic. To stop at labeling these 
populations ―essentially‖ criminal, as the concept of the sociopath does, is 
far too convenient for the current social order. Instead, the eminently 
predictable criminality of these populations should place them at the crux 
of an emancipatory argument like that made by Marx. 
 
 
 103. This view is echoed by no less a figurehead of the legal community than Clarence Darrow. In 
his ―Address to the Prisoners in the Cook County Jail,‖ Darrow notes the disconnect between ―crime‖ 
and ―right conduct,‖ the fact that crime seems very much a predictable function of which social class is 
performing the act in question (and for what reasons), and goes so far as to argue for the abolition of 
jails. In a particularly moving passage he avers that: 
I will guarantee to take from this jail, or any jail in the world, five hundred men who have 
been the worst criminals and lawbreakers who ever got into jail, and I will go down to our 
lowest street and take five hundred of the most abandoned prostitutes, and go out somewhere 
where there is plenty of land, and they will be as good people as the average in the 
community.  
ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN THE COURTROOM 14 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 
University of Chicago Press 1989) (1957). Cf. SHELDEN, supra note 68, at 289 (explaining that the 
displacement of blame onto criminal elements serves to protect the existing social order).  
 104. Compare SADOCK, supra note 8, with Ogloff, supra note 16. 
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If we nonetheless—and hypothetically105—refer by ―sociopath‖ to a 
class of people neurobiologically inclined toward crime, we can still locate 
several Marxist rationales to avoid dealing with them through punitive 
modalities. For the non-Marxist compatibilist who is not already 
convinced that exculpatory measures like the insanity defense ought to 
apply, the possibility—and therefore obligation, in the interests of utility—
to reshape criminogenic social conditions should be of primary 
importance. Better to have institutions that reflect a desire to change 
society than to have ones that reflect the sort of sadism that prefers 
punishment to the alleviation of crime in the first instance. Or, as Marx 
more eloquently put it: ―Now, what a state of society is that, which knows 
of no better Instrument for its own defense than the hangman, and which 
proclaims through the ‗leading journal of the world‘ its own brutality as 
eternal law?‖106 
For those who adopt the libertarian view of moral responsibility, 
retrospection still intercedes on behalf of the sociopath. The cognitive or 
emotional deficits (with respect to the established order) that a priori make 
compliance with social norms difficult and less likely are transmuted into 
predictable noncompliance when considered a posteriori. A different 
social order would predict different criminological outcomes. In this sense, 
the sociopath is as much a victim as a perpetrator, and treatment 
modalities are far more appropriate than punitive ones.
107
 
Yet even for those who embrace the radical logic of Marx‘s argument 
there may still be the occasional temptation, born of certain unremitting 
cultural messages, to lapse back into sociopath panic. What if there really 
are super-criminal, ―intraspecies predators‖ that will continue to live 
among us, irrespective of the social order? We can vaccinate ourselves 
against this panic by returning to the reasons for which the concept of the 
sociopath endures. This demands of us that we examine the current social 
order, where the worst sociopaths are not even on the criminal justice 
system‘s radar. 
 
 
 105. As hinted at by the brief discussion of the ―continuum view,‖ Sasso, supra note 74. That said, 
establishing a physiological basis for criminality is probably impossible in principle. See Amanda 
Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 183 (2009) (arguing that relevant epistemic assumptions, including the localization of brain 
function and the otherization of criminal elements, are inherently untenable).  
 106. Marx, supra note 70.  
 107. Though it may be that the only viable treatment is in fact large-scale social change, as 
personality disorders like antisocial personality disorder ―seem remarkably resistant to treatment, 
especially any psychoanalytically-oriented approach that requires critical self-consciousness.‖ 
Weisberg, supra note 52, at 69. 
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In terms of institutional sociopathy, Joel Bakan has done much to 
spread awareness of the fact that corporations are, by legal mandate, 
textbook sociopaths.
108
 Furthermore, given their prominence and 
influence, they are dangerous on a hegemonic scale: ―pragmatic concern 
for its own interests and the laws of the land constrain the corporation‘s 
predatory instincts, and often that is not enough to stop it from destroying 
lives, damaging communities, and endangering the planet as a whole.‖109 
Corporations even hide their disdain for the rights of others behind an 
analogue to Cleckley‘s mask of sanity: corporate social responsibility, 
while illegal to the extent that it cuts into profit margins,
110
 is allowed to 
exist precisely to the extent it is dissembling—to the extent it distracts 
from corporate abuses and externalities.
111
 On top of all this, our current 
neoliberal paradigm has deregulated, privatized, and subsidized to the 
point that corporations are essentially left to regulate themselves.
112
 
Lawbreaking and compliance with the law have become simply a matter 
 
 
 108. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 28 
(2004) (―[T]he corporation. . . . Remains . . . a legally designated ‗person‘ designed to valorize self-
interest and invalidate moral concern. Most people would find its ‗personality‘ abhorrent, even 
psychopathic, in a human being, yet curiously we accept it in society‘s most powerful institution.‖). 
Interestingly, Bakan employs R.D. Hare and his diagnostic instrument (which I have criticized as 
applied to individuals, supra Part C) to conclude that corporations are psychopaths in the most 
frightening sense of the term:  
The corporation is irresponsible, Dr. Hare said, because ―in an attempt to satisfy the corporate 
goal, everybody else is put at risk.‖ Corporations try to ―manipulate everything, including 
public opinion,‖ and they are grandiose, always insisting ―that we‘re number one, we‘re the 
best.‖ A lack of empathy and asocial tendencies are also key characteristics of the 
corporation, says Hare—―their behavior indicates they don‘t really concern themselves with 
their victims‖; and corporations often refuse to accept responsibility for their own actions and 
are unable to feel remorse: ―if [corporations] get caught [breaking the law], they pay big fines 
and they . . . continue doing what they did before anyway. And in fact in many cases the fines 
and the penalties paid by the organization are trivial compared to the profits that they rake 
in.‖  
Id. at 57 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting from an interview with Dr. Hare). 
 109. Id. at 60. 
 110. Id. at 37 (―The ‗best interests of the corporation‘ principle, now a fixture in the corporate law 
of most countries . . . . forbids any other motivation for their actions, whether to assist workers, 
improve the environment, or help consumers save money.‖). 
 111. Id. at 57. While arguing that corporate social responsibility ought to be tolerated only to the 
extent it is insincere, neoliberal paragon Milton Friedman informs us that ―hypocrisy is virtuous when 
it serves the bottom line. Moral virtue is immoral when it does not.‖ Id. at 34 (quoting from an 
interview with Friedman). 
 112. BAKAN, supra note 108, at 110 (―No one would seriously suggest that individuals should 
regulate themselves, that laws against murder, assault, and theft are unnecessary because people are 
socially responsible. Yet oddly, we are asked to believe that corporate persons—institutional 
psychopaths who lack any sense of moral conviction and who have the power and motivation to cause 
harm and devastation in the world—should be left free to govern themselves.‖). 
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of financial costs versus benefits.
113
 Yet for all this, corporations are 
excluded from the discourse of pathology. In fact, their existence and 
machinations are celebrated. 
To the extent our most powerful institutions shape our characters, it is 
unsurprising that sociopathy as an ethic—as opposed to a pathology—has 
come to exist in our current social order.
114
 To see the way in which 
institutional sociopathy broadcasts itself to the individual, take, for 
example, the influential ―objectivism‖ of Ayn Rand.115 Objectivism 
exemplifies the all-too-often ignored tension between a political 
philosophy of radical individualism and the very concept of crime as 
social transgression. This is perhaps best illustrated by Rand‘s own 
intellectual love affair with a conscience-free murderer:  
Rand was much taken with the idea of the violent criminal as moral 
hero, a Nietzschean transvaluator of all values; according to Burns, 
she ―found criminality an irresistible metaphor for individualism.‖ 
A literary Leopold and Loeb, she plotted out a novella based on the 
actual case of a murderer who strangled a 12-year-old girl. The 
murderer, said Rand, ―is born with a wonderful, free, light 
consciousness—resulting from the absolute lack of social instinct or 
herd feeling. He does not understand, because he has no organ for 
understanding, the necessity, meaning or importance of other 
people.‖116  
 
 
 113. Id. at 79–80. 
 114. Id. at 134 (―Human nature is neither static nor universal. It tends to reflect the social orders 
people inhabit. . . . As the corporation comes to dominate society—through, among other things, 
privatization and commercialization—its ideal conception of human nature inevitably becomes 
dominant too.‖). What is this ideal conception? In answer, Bakan quotes philosopher Mark Kingwell: 
―From the point of view of the corporation, the ideal citizen is a kind of insanely rapacious consumer, 
[driven by a] kind of psychopathic version of self-interest.‖ Id. at 135 (quoting from an interview with 
Mark Kingwell). Given the vast influence of the corporation as an institution, this is very likely a 
primary aspect of the social order working to create, with the support of psychiatry and the criminal 
law, those sociopaths that the criminal law deals with on a regular basis. 
 115. Many in government, the corporate world, and the political right regard her as a foundational 
influence. See, e.g., Frank Bond et al., Atlas and the World, CATO POLICY REPORT (Dec. 1997), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/cpr-19n6-5.html (discussing her influence in these 
respects); see also Corey Robin, Garbage and Gravitas, THE NATION, June 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/garbage-and-gravitas (―In 1998 readers responding to a Modern 
Library poll identified Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead as the two greatest novels of the 
twentieth century—surpassing Ulysses, To the Lighthouse and Invisible Man. In 1991 a survey by the 
Library of Congress and the Book-of-the-Month Club found that, with the exception of the Bible, no 
book has influenced more American readers than Atlas Shrugged.”). 
 116. Id. 
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It is no coincidence that what Rand admired in this individual exemplifies 
the very worst descriptions of sociopathic pathology. For there to be 
intelligibly ―criminal‖ actions presupposes a restraint on individual desire 
in the name of the common good, whether by way of institutional norms 
or the policeman‘s truncheon. To both the sociopath of legend and the 
objectivist, however, the true immorality lies in the restraint of one‘s own 
desires. To the extent that it is not uncommon to entertain philosophies 
like Rand‘s, or to actualize them on a systemic level as the corporate world 
does, there is a degree to which society both creates and embraces this sort 
of genuine sociopath.  
CONCLUSION 
How is it possible, then, that those who stand furthest from the criminal 
law‘s punishment—senators, CEOs, and other respectable sorts—profess 
to be so heavily influenced by Rand, and to wield power in such an 
antisocial, destructive fashion? Pathology for psychiatry, as with 
criminalization for law, comes to serve a dual function: on the one hand, it 
demarcates a realm of unacceptably deviant behavior. On the other hand, 
by that very same act, it impliedly legitimizes the remainder—irrespective 
of actual social cost. Our common presuppositions about what conduct is 
pathological or criminal are shaped by institutions like psychiatry and law, 
and these institutions are shaped by power. Thus, power may legitimate 
the most despicable conduct of which humanity is capable, so long as it 
has appropriate scapegoats on which to foist our fear and blame. And what 
better scapegoat could there be than the pathological criminal? Unlike the 
corporation, whose indispensible commodities suffuse and structure our 
daily existence, the sociopath—a monstrous, alienated Other—is a proper 
bogeyman. Psychiatry and the criminal justice system immanentize the 
sociopath through individual actors so that this bogeyman can be caged 
and punished, and our fears vindicated. Yet so long as the social 
conditions necessary for crime are maintained, there remain an indefinite 
number to busy our antipathy down the road. 
In this light, it is hard to take very seriously the scaremongering that 
arises from the possibility of insufficiently punishing sociopaths. When 
the scale of permissible sociopathy so outstrips that of criminalized 
sociopathy as it has in our current social order, it is a sign: the social order 
is awry, and more in need of fixing than those individuals who are 
sanctioned for transgressing it.  
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